

AIR

RGBA-39580

Chief, EE (THRU COS)

26 February 1957

ATTN: [] & []
Chief of Base, Berlin

INFO: Chief of Station, Germany
ATTN: [] []

- CADORY/Operational
- LOCHASSOCK

REF: RGB-39340

1. The reference dispatch and the references thereto should now provide the necessary information required to present the project for redocumentation. An outstanding question in connection therewith is the advisability of having the Field redraft the project outline taking into consideration all of the views and conclusions presented in the latest exchange of correspondence. If EE and COS so desire, BOB will be glad to undertake this job.

2. In view of the volume of correspondence, time and effort which this comparatively simple review and redocumentation has occasioned, BOB would like to present once more in summary form its reasons for continuing the project in much the same form and for rejecting some of the views and conclusions expressed in the Headquarters review and in other papers. We hope this will spare the addressees the time required to review and analyze all of the correspondence to date. The main points of issue in this project seem to have been (1) creative approach, (2) efficiency of distribution, (3) possibility of excessive expenditure, (4) indications of effectiveness, and (5) KUBARK requirements for such projects.

3. Distribution: In view of past experiences, BOB holds that the availability of testable distribution mechanisms is the first requirement for any

APPROVED _____

FEB show

Distribution:

- 4 - EE
- 2 - COS

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operation involving the infiltration of materials to an audience behind the Iron Curtain. Unless the product reaches the target, the other factors may provide an interesting exercise but nothing more. LOCCASOCK uses mainly West German mailing plus some hand distribution and some West Berlin border sales to effect distribution. In all instances, we are reasonably satisfied that the product reached the audience on the basis of available evidence. BOB has consistently maintained that at least 50% of West German mailed items by LOCCASOCK reach the consumer; the FJMOCTURN material would indicate a considerably higher percentage if it is presumed to be a valid indication of infiltration at all. The limited remaining hand distribution also gives fairly reasonable indications of effective infiltration based on continuing tests by CAFFERY and his associates. Border sales, of course, are directly to East Germans and there can be no question that the distribution has reached the audience.

4. It seems to us that the one conclusion was drawn in the Headquarters review which speaks of overproduction beyond distribution capabilities is erroneous. Apparently the reviewer proceeded on the assumption that the number of copies left on hand at the end of the month varies between 20 and 60,000 copies. However, this figure fluctuates and does not show an accumulative increase so that obviously an amount roughly equal to the monthly production is being distributed monthly. The monthly inventory total will, of course, vary depending upon the receipt of material from the printer and the transmission of material to the West German mailers. In other projects (handling mass propaganda) it is not unusual to have as much as a half million items on hand on the day that the inventory is taken.

5. Returning to LOCCASOCK, it will be noted that as high as 70,000 items have been distributed during one month in 1956 while at the same time, certain items were held for three or four months in order to permit the border salesmen a greater assortment for their display. Needless to say, the items still sold even though several months elapsed after the date of publication.

6. The Creative Approach: LOCCASOCK has for the past two years operated on the principle that specific audiences were better influenced through the use of properly selected stimuli built into attractive media. This was undoubtedly a natural consequence of the original modus operandi which began with the camouflaging of anti-Communist propaganda by including it within the falsified covers of a regular Communist magazine. Over a period of years, both the Communists and the anti-Communists recognized the need for selling their products in a form which would appeal to the indifferent and to the antagonistic. Communist propaganda directed to the non-Soviet Bloc is illustrative of this trend. It consists of

really slick, multi-color publications, sometimes political, more often not, in content. LOCASOCK, whose target has always been the information media experts of the Communists as well as the Soviet Zone population, tested and found appropriate countermeasures in that it produced media designed to force the Communists to revamp their own output of internal propaganda, at least in selected fields. Slick covers, good photography, articles written to both attract the reader and to induce at least an indirect response all combines to demonstrate that an audience (Germans) subjected to many years of propagandistic hectoring would still be responsive. This is true not only of the relatively small primary target group among the population but also of the Communist propaganda experts responsible for Soviet Zone media. In the latter case, it can even be argued that the German Communists found the LOCASOCK publications a worthy argument against their Soviet mentors in the struggle to prevent complete Sovietization of East German media.

7. The LOCASOCK media also takes cognizance of basic German approaches to the problem of anti-Communism. A Germany caught between the two major fronts and dependent upon both for realization of its own objectives such as reunification was bound to be impressed by the relaxation of tensions at international levels beginning in 1955. There resulted an intense and fervent desire on the part of the Germans to believe that the cold war would be replaced by an era of coexistence which would be conducive to reunification and reestablishment of Germany as a world power alongside of the two major blocks. This trend in German thinking (even though somewhat wishful) still continues and has only temporarily been set back by the brutal Soviet repression of Hungary. "Aggressive anti-Communism" today is completely acceptable only in dealing with thoroughly discredited Stalinists such as Ulbricht.

8. We believe that the LOCASOCK approach will become more and more popular and in fact will constitute the major approach in written material vis-a-vis the satellites and the Soviet Union in the coming months. An aggressive approach to propaganda directed at Poland, Yugoslavia or even the Soviet Union today would be deprecated and denounced by a majority of the European government officials including the so-called cold warriors. On the other hand, the projection of Westernism as we prefer to call this approach is not only acceptable but endorsed by the same Western circles. The projection principle affords the captive East German audience information and advice without provoking to violence.

9. One gains the impression in reading the Headquarters review that all LOCASOCK publications are considered more or less on a par and that no distinction is made between the relative time and effort spent on each. It should be noted that the four main publications produced and attributed to CARDINALE

represent the bulk of the activity in terms of man power and funds. The other items with few exceptions are the part-time work of one or two editors each, are often used to hit targets of opportunity on short notice, and require relatively little extra effort. Furthermore, these minor publications are not only created but also produced, i.e. set up and printed within the LOCCASOCK shop so that the main cost is that of paper, stamps and envelopes.

10. Of the major publications, agreement exists that three are worthwhile and even though the format of one of these has been altered, these should continue. The value of DIE FRAU as pro-Western anti-Communist propaganda is in dispute and presumably will continue to be so as long as there is disagreement on the significance of the role of women in politics and in a society. At one extreme is the Hitler principle of Kinder, Kirche und Kueche for women, at the other is the emancipated role played by women in American life. We hold that German language propaganda encouraging women to achieve the latter role in Germany is worthwhile particularly since the Communists are also endeavoring to harness women to the totalitarian concept. We are gratified to note that Home Office secretaries find this magazine attractive. We have tried the same tests of its appeal and message utilizing staffers' wives and CALAMATE's daughters who are not only attracted by the magazine but also can read German and understand the political nuances of life in Berlin and the Soviet Zone.

11. Indications of Effectiveness: The most direct indication is, of course, the satisfactory results of distribution control checks plus a continuing stream of letters from the Soviet Zone and the rest of the Soviet Bloc requesting additional copies of the publications or otherwise expressing an interest in their contents. This latter method of judging effectiveness has been subjected to rigid and conservative standards within LOCCASOCK so that the so-called reader correspondents are reported only if LOCCASOCK is convinced that the response is genuine. Also, it should be noted that many of the reader correspondents are persons exercising influence on a group, such as newspaper editors, secretaries of local FBI chapters, doctors, barbers, etc. In addition, in view of the Headquarters review comments, we have requested CARRIER to run one-time tests on various publications in order to get spot responses which will give broader indications of effectiveness.

12. The effectiveness of LOCCASOCK in influencing its secondary targets, i.e. the agit/prop sections and the individuals connected with Soviet Zone information media is admittedly difficult to judge. We do have a number of "signs" which indicated that LOCCASOCK is making progress in this respect. That is, we have already reported the appearance of women's fashion pages and finally a slick women's magazine in the Zone which must be attributed at least partially to the

LOGANSOCK impact upon the population and upon the propagandists who recognize the appeal and the danger for the Communists contained in DIE FRAU. (It can well be argued that German Communist propagandists would like to pursue their own rather than the "Stalinist" system of indoctrinating the population. The regular appearance of DIE FRAU and other publications gives them an opening wedge against the "Stalinist" arguments.) FERNSEHPRINTER also has set the style for reprints of editorial comments in both Communist publications and also in those of Western resistance groups and other organizations.

13. In attempting to evaluate these indirect indications, it must be remembered that even the West German information media are still undergoing considerable changes and that the introduction of many items which U. S. publications have long accepted is a slow process. The projection of Americanism as part of the projection of the Westernism thus proceeds at a number of levels and stages. As a final commentary on indications of effectiveness, we wish to state that we appreciate the questions raised by the Headquarters review and are undertaking action to resolve these questions objectively. One of the best ways of doing this, of course, is to incorporate CARDINAL so that it can sell its publications to East Germans, either directly or through a middleman. If our estimate of salesability of these publications is borne out, it will be a good indication that the publications are wanted by and reach the East German audience.

14. Experimentation: We have utilized LOGANSOCK for experimentation in both production and distribution of printed media because the composition of the staff had sufficient flexibility to lend itself to these practices easily. Obviously this is much less the case in projects, such as CARROIT, LOPASAN or [], which have fairly well defined spheres of activity. Projects such as [] and [], whose policies are to a great extent determined by the parent organizations, are also somewhat inflexible.

15. Judging by past experience, we see no reason ^{why} LOGANSOCK should not be given experimental sub-projects in the future. These experiments are regarded by both GABRIEL and ourselves in the nature of by-product unless one proves as successful as to warrant incorporating it into going activities. As special examples, we would like to mention the LOGANSOCK contribution to the campaign against Johannes BECHER which resulted in forcing the latter to retreat back into his shell in East Berlin. Another example is the item called "Was denkt Berlin" which was taken on by LOGANSOCK at our instructions after the U. S. Commandant, Berlin requested continuing information on the attitudes of the West Berlin and East Berlin populations. Significant portions of the

LOCASOCK is currently excerpted, summarized, translated and reproduced by ID/USCIB in accordance with the U. S. Commandant's wishes. It is, of course, possible that because of the amount of correspondence devoted to LOCASOCK experimentation, the impression may have been given that experimentation is typical of the project's approach to KUCAGE activities. This is not so and as noted above, we shall concentrate on demonstrating that the normal activities of the project are effective, are well executed and are producing a needed impact in the Soviet Zone.

16. The KUBARK Role: The history of LOCASOCK fairly well suffices to explain the KUBARK role in the project. LOCASOCK was first supported by CANASH, was then taken over by LCLAVEN when internal friction forced CANASH out of the Soviet Zone propaganda business and finally was accepted by KUBARK when the Ambassador decided that LCLAVEN and its successor CBACID/GRIFLOWASH should cease grey activities. In other words, KUBARK took over the job because no other agency was in the position to continue. This has nothing to do with the value of the operation per se since both CANASH and GRIFLOWASH regard the LOCASOCK output very highly and today more than ever are convinced that this approach to psychological warfare should be expanded. Neither of these latter agencies is, of course, aware of the fact that LOCASOCK lends itself to black operations and to incidental KUFINE exploitation. In fact, probably neither of the overt agencies realize that LOCASOCK conducts continuing political action in information media circles in Berlin. While we appreciate that there is a certain line of thinking within KUBARK which realizes that requirements for unilateral clandestine operations are far from being fulfilled, and concludes that therefore we should disengage from grey operations if possible, it is still believed sound practice to continue those grey operations which we have found to be profitable over a period of years. In fact, we predict that very few, if any, KUCAGE activities in the mass media field will be conducted outside the framework of the KUBARK/GRIFLOWASH and/or KUBARK/CANASH/CANIDENBAIL liaison in the foreseeable future. In conclusion, it should be noted that LOCASOCK performs a definite and coordinated function within the EOB-based CACONY program, the latter in turn is keyed into the entire spectrum of activities directed to the Soviet Zone of Germany ranging from intelligence through psych warfare to religious and charitable. The exposition and explanation of how these activities cross, interrelate and supplement each other must be the subject of a separate paper. In fact, if Headquarters still entertains serious reservations on LOCASOCK or other projects, it is recommended that the undersigned be recalled on short IDY for consultation.